Demining the Tajik-Uzbek Border:
What have we learned from
the Tajik experience?
by Henrique Garbino [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ] and Erkin Huseinov
[ UNDP Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme ]
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Figure 1. Mine victims on the Tajik-Uzbek border in comparison with the rest of Tajikistan.6
All figures courtesy of the authors.

F

ollowing the recent political rapprochement between

were laid. As recently as 2001, Uzbek forces laid anti-personnel

the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in

landmines along the still-disputed border with Tajikistan, re-

March 2018, a joint commission was created to inves-

portedly to prevent incursions from Islamic militants operat-

tigate the minefields along the Tajik-Uzbek border and sched-

ing in the area.7 While it is likely that most of the minefields

ule their clearance.1 The Uzbek government first expressed the

were laid on the Uzbek side of the border, Tajik authorities

intention to remove the landmines along its borders in 2004

consider the overall area to have a “high degree of mine risk

and later reported the start of unilateral demining operations

on both sides of the border.”8

in 2005 by the Uzbek military.2–4 Less than three years later,

The Tajik-Uzbek border is approximately 1,230 km (764.3

Uzbek demining teams had reportedly cleared 95 percent of

mi) long and runs along 17 districts in eastern and north-

the minefields along the Tajik border.5 However, this has not

ern Tajikistan. According to the Tajik statistical agency,

been verified by independent organizations, and civilians still

there are about three million people living in these districts,

fall victim to landmines in that region.6

who are mostly engaged in agriculture.9 The Uzbek govern-

The border between the countries is still disputed and re-

ment claims that landmines were planted in the mountain-

mains mostly unmarked, making it difficult, if not impossi-

ous border areas, which are difficult to monitor and control.

ble, to determine precisely on which side of the border mines

However, according to a 2004 report from the Integrated

ISSUE 22.3 @ NOVEMBER 2018

45

Figure 2. Mine accidents along the Tajik-Uzbek border.6

Regional Information Networks (IRIN), experts suggest up

by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has worked

to 70 percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border might have been

to address the mine contamination in Afghanistan’s Darwaz

mined, including the flatlands.2

posal (EOD) courses were supported by the Organization for

Tajikistan and along the Tajik-Afghan border, no clearance has

Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Dushanbe.

occurred along the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border. At least 157

The courses enhanced regional EOD capability and strength-

people have experienced mine accidents along the Tajik-Uzbek

ened defense cooperation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

border, accounting for roughly half of all mine casualties in
Tajikistan since 1999.6 Despite the risk posed by anti-personnel
mines, no land release activity has taken place on the Tajik side
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province. In addition, several regional explosive ordnance dis-

While mine clearance has been conducted in central

Understanding the Problem
Even though the minefields, which are reportedly defen-

except for limited impact surveys.10 To date, the exact locations

sive in nature, are thought to be mostly on the Uzbek side

of the minefields are unknown to Tajik authorities.8

of the border, there have been a series of mine accidents in

Humanitarian demining in the region clearly presents

Tajik-claimed territory.6 A great part of the problem lies in

many technical and political challenges. However, the experi-

the fact that the Tajik-Uzbek border is still disputed and

ences accumulated from almost fifteen years of mine action in

is mostly unmarked.11 Moreover, minefields or individual

other regions of the country offer many opportunities. Tajik

mines might have been moved due to natural phenomena,

national authorities, together with implementing partners,

such as heavy rainfall, landslides, avalanches, or earth-

have established the necessary structures and coordination

quakes, or even local citizens might have manually moved

mechanisms for effective mine action in Tajikistan.

individual mines. 8,12

Moreover, the country has provided examples of bilateral

From 2011 to 2015, the Tajikistan National Mine Action

and regional cooperation initiatives. For instance, the Tajik-

Centre (TNMAC) coordinated mixed teams that con-

Afghan cross-border mine clearance project implemented

ducted non-technical survey missions to assess the risk of
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Figure 3. Mine accidents by altitude and distance from the border.6

contamination in the ten districts bordering Uzbekistan in

because they did not have enough access to the minefields due

Sughd province. The surveys registered 82 mine accidents and

to border security concerns.6,14 At least six other districts bor-

60 suspected hazardous areas in six of those districts.6 The

dering Uzbekistan remain to be surveyed.15

lack of demarcation makes it easy for locals, often looking for

Laid according to Russian military doctrine, Uzbek mine-

fodder, firewood, or to cross the border to meet family mem-

fields are likely to be recorded, mapped, and mostly com-

bers, to stray across the minefields.8 TNMAC officially con-

prised of anti-personnel mines.16,17 Based on impact survey

cluded that minefields were at least 50 m (54.7 yd) into the

reports and national averages, it is possible to estimate an ini-

Uzbek side of the border; however, three accidents occurred

tial confirmed hazardous area of roughly 3.3 sq km (1.27 sq

in Tajik territory. In the first accident, an explosive device

mi), which is calculated to take approximately three years for

was likely moved by mudslides from the mountains and then

full clearance.18 When compared with the initial assessment

collected by children from the nearby village. The second and

proposed by IRIN in 2004, the available data on mine acci-

third accidents occurred in the same area and within a couple

dents along the Tajik-Uzbek border suggest a completely dif-

of hours when a shepherd stepped on a landmine (most like-

ferent picture. It is estimated that only 3 percent, or 35.8 km

ly an OZM-72) in territory that had previously been cleared

(22.25 mi), of the border is mined.19 One should also take into

by Uzbek deminers, and when his grandson came to help, the

account that the estimation is based on casualty data, thus

grandson fell victim to another landmine. It should be not-

likely to be underreported, and that not all districts along the

ed here that TNMAC’s conclusions are somewhat subjective

border have been surveyed.

13

Figure 4. Tajik-Uzbek border elevation profile.20
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Figure 5. Donor funding for the Tajikistan mine action program from 2010 to 2017.6

Even though no mine clearance operation has taken place

undertake quality assurance and land release up to inter-

on the Tajik side of the border, the National Strategy of the

national standards, and implemented information manage-

Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action ac-

ment mechanisms. 22–24

knowledges the mine threat in the region. Accordingly,

Moreover, previous victim assistance exchange programs

TNMAC has targeted the districts of Panjakent, Ayni, Asht,

and the current cross-border operations in Afghanistan have

Isfara, Shahriston, and Konibodom for mine risk education

shown that TNMAC is willing and able to cooperate with re-

and victim assistance programs.8

gional counterparts.25,26 Largely boosted by OSCE, Tajikistan

Mine clearance in the region is likely to be affected by ex-

has become a key actor in supporting regional cooperation for

treme temperatures, heavy rainfall, and landslides in spring

capacity building and information sharing in mine action and

and summer, and snow in winter. Limited capacity for casu-

explosive hazards clearance.27

alty evacuation further limits mine clearance activities. As a

Even though political relations between Uzbekistan and

result, manual demining teams are only able to work about

Tajikistan have been fragile at best, demining their shared bor-

nine months per year in Tajikistan, without accounting for

ders may present a good opportunity for closer cooperation in

rest, recreation, and bad weather.11 In central Tajikistan as

security issues. Furthermore, experienced implementing part-

well as along the Tajik-Afghan border, demining teams work,

ners could be tasked to carry out mine clearance in the region as

on average, less than 130 days per year. Our findings indicate

an independent neutral third party.28 Finally, the successful start

that around 50 percent of the minefields on the Tajik-Uzbek

of a cooperation program between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

border were laid in flat areas and would allow for mechanical

could lead to renewed donor interest in the region.

demining and dog detection technologies, which can considerably increase the efficiency of demining operations.6,11
The involvement of international organizations in the demining effort could help facilitate the interaction between the
two governments; however, bureaucracy and rigid decisionmaking structures often delay and sometimes impede the
work of these organizations in supporting the mine action
program in Tajikistan.17 Furthermore, recent developments in
international funding for the Tajik mine action program suggest donor fatigue.21
Cross-border Cooperation
In spite of the many challenges presented above, the Tajik
experience suggests there are many opportunities for demining the border with Uzbekistan. Since 2003, TNMAC
has developed national mine action standards, created a
national mine action center, established working relationships with its implementing partners, trained personnel to
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